Private Queries on Public Certificate Transparency Data by Phan, Vy-An
Private Queries on Public Certificate Transparency Data
Vy An Phan
Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences
University of California at Berkeley
Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2019-27
http://www2.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2019/EECS-2019-27.html
May 9, 2019
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
09
47
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
3 M
ay
 20
19
Copyright © 2019, by the author(s).
All rights reserved.
 
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission.
 
Acknowledgement
 
I would like to thank Jean-Luc Watson and Edward Oakes, for their great
contributions to the system-level improvements discussed in this paper.
 
I would also like to thank my advisors, Doug Tygar and Raluca Ada Popa, for
their support and advice throughout this project.


Abstract
Despite increasing advancements in today’s information exchange infrastructure, the preservation
of user data and privacy still remains a problem. Both insecure baselines and secure solutions leak
user data. For example, Certicate Transparency (CT) promises signicant security improvements
to existing Public Key Infrastructure solutions that up-to-now have solely relied on the Certicate
Authority hierarchy. CT provides a robust auditing layer and transparency solution to quickly
detect such compromises, but introduces the requirement that client browsers interact with
third-party servers when validating a site certicate.
In the existing CT system, these requests leak information about each user’s browsing habits
to the hosting server. It is not a stretch to think that this valuable data could be collected and
exploited, as corporations and governments have plenty of nancial and political incentive to do
so. In this project, we seek to address this problem by using an oblivious le sharing system with
strong anonymity properties, to provide a more scalable, performant solution to privacy-preserving
queries.
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1 Introduction
Modern secure communication between users and websites requires on the exchange of public
keys. The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a core underpinning technology of the modern internet,
enabling secure trac (e.g. via TLS) between clients and servers.
Traditionally, users depended on central certicate authorities (CAs) for issuing, moderating,
and verifying certicates. This model of putting all trust into a single point of failure has proven to
be far from perfect. There are documented cases of CAs incorrectly issuing certicates [1, 11], being
attacked by malicious third parties [5], and even engaging in malicious behavior themselves [20].
Even worse, failure in the CA system is an "or" condition, not an "and" condition. There are dozens
of CAs in existence, and it only takes one of them to be compromised in order for all the sites
dependent on it to be compromised, even if said websites had their public keys stored with other
CAs. These incidents can expose large numbers of users to active man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attacks.
In response to these growing concerns, Certicate Transparency (CT) is a new protocol that
addresses these issues by enabling users, CAs, and domain owners to audit certicate changes
and identify and monitor potential modications directly relevant to them [4]. Recently, CT has
seen uptake by both web browsers and CAs, with Google Chrome requiring all trusted CAs to
partake in the protocol since 2017 [2]. All changes are logged via hashed chains of Merkle tree
roots, preventing editing of prior history and allowing easy auditing of future changes.
However, CT is not without its aws. In particular, it represents an additional communication
channel — as part of normal operation, users query servers hosting CT log for certicates matching
domains with which they wish to communicate as shown in Figure 1.1. This querying is a central
part of the CT protocol, but has the side eect that a malicious log server can glean private
information about the user from their queries, namely, correlating the IP address of the request
with the domains visited over time.
Such tracking could easily be performed without consent. Particularly worrisome is that these
log servers have nancial incentive to do exactly that: transparently collect user browsing data
and sell it to industry players in advertisement and tracking. This example is just one of many
instances that illustrate the privacy concerns that arise from requiring users to contact a third
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Figure 1.1: A simplied architecture diagram for Certicate Transparency. Assuming an honest-
but-curious log server, request C is problematic as it reveals to the log server what sites
the client is visiting.
party (CT logs) to communicate with any desired domain. In general, users should be able to
benet from CT without sacricing their privacy.
Previous eorts to maintain privacy in Certicate Transparency and other data retrieval systems
are discussed in Section 7. In this project, we seek to extend the CT protocol to preserve users’
privacy from the log servers that they query.
We outline our denition of privacy with subsequent design goals in this setting in Section 3.
Our solution should be usable and scalable, in order to eciently service hundreds of millions of
users, without sacricing user privacy by revealing their queries to the server.
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In Section 4 we describe our solution. We use an ORAM le sharing system [oram-lesharing]
to achieve the base security properties, and add system-level performance improvements to make
it more usable. We do this by precomputing encryption exponentiations and garbled circuits,
pipelining phases of the transfer protocol, and batching requests.
Despite implementing all of our improvements, we discovered that we did not meet our scalability
goals. Even so, we saw better performance that points to a possibility of meeting those goals in
the future. This will be further discussed in Section 5.
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2 Related Work
2.1 Privacy in Certificate Transparency
Since Certicate Transparency’s inception, there have been signicant extensions to increase its
functionality and security. For example, CT has been extended to support certicate revocation
and subsequent applications including end-to-end encrypted mail [6].
Additionally, the security guarantees of CT have been demonstrated via cryptographic proper-
ties [7] and measurement studies have been conducted to evaluate how it is used in practice and
the dierences between public CT logs [10].
However, evaluation and extension of the privacy properties of CT have not been as thoroughly
scrutinized. Eskandarian et al. identied and proposed a solution to privacy issues related to
browsers auditing a CT log and extended CT to support non-public subdomains [8]. To the best of
our knowledge, however, there does not exist an extension to CT that preserves users’ privacy
when interacting with CT logs.
2.2 Oblivious RAM
An adversary with access to a machine’s data access patterns can gain nontrivial information
about a particular process, even if the data itself is encrypted. Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [9] schemes
prevent this by randomizing data access patterns in such a way that observing them reveals no
information about the data being accessed. This is especially useful in the case where a client or
user wishes to access data on a server or machine without revealing what that data is.
Primitive approaches to ORAM are not very ecient. Path ORAM [17] is an improvement on
traditional ORAM by storing data blocks in a tree structure. It only requires that the client store a
location mapping of data blocks. As such, its bandwidth eciency can be reduced to logarithmic or
poly-logarithmic if the client wishes to recursively store the location mappings as another oblivious
tree. This construction has the best bandwidth eciency among the known ORAM protocols and
requires little storage on the client’s part. While it is very good in the secure processor setting,
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however, it still suers from a complex memory block eviction strategy (O(D log2 N )) that, while
more optimal for certain problems, does not work well in the multi-party computation setting.
Circuit ORAM [19] is a related ORAM variant which achieves a near-optimal circuit size for
realistic memory block sizes. Also tree-based, it takes advantage of preemptive metadata scans to
complete the eviction algorithm in one pass, substantially improving the eviction eciency. This
makes it more useful for multi-party computation between servers than Path ORAM.
2.3 Two-Party Computation
Two-Party Computation (2PC) protocols provide a way for two parties A band B to compute a
mutual result f (a,b) without revealing their respective secret inputs a and b to each other [12].
Both parties start by agreeing on the evaluating function f and obfuscating their secret inputs,
most commonly by XOR-ing with a random value. A generates garbled circuits [21] that compute
f (as well as the required commitments for consistency checks), while B evaluates and decodes
the result based on the information sent by A.
Privacy is preserved because each party is involved in a dierent share of the computation.
A knows the random values used in generating the garbled circuit but never comes in contact
with input b. B receives A’s inputs, but does not know what it is because A is in charge of the
scrambling and encryption.
2.4 Oblix
Oblix [14], or OBLivious IndeX, is a space- and time- ecient search index that neither leaks
access patterns nor result size. It works by maintaining an obliviously sorted multimap, which
essentially links keys to values while ensuring that any given client requests are computationally
indistinguishable from random requests. To do so it requires many of the same cryptographic
techniques that we will use in our proposed solution, including garbling, ORAM, Merkle hash
trees, and oblivious data structures (including the obliviously sorted multimap).
Oblix has been demonstrated to be useful in private retrieval of public keys in the case of
certicate transparency, and in fact solves the basic problem statement presented at the beginning
of this paper. However, it does rely on trusting secure hardware enclaves, which our solution will
avoid.
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3 Design
3.1 Security
3.1.1 Threat Model
We assume that we have access to two non-colluding servers. These servers can be passive
eavesdroppers (honest-but-curious) — they can observe any local state not secret-shared between
the servers and have full access to client communications with itself.
While requiring two non-colluding servers is perhaps unrealistic in many domains, it ts the
certicate transparency system well, where many dierent companies are providing CT services.
These dierent entities could very well be nancial competitors (e.g. Google versus Symantec), and
sharing collected datasets would eliminate their commercial advantages. Under our threat model,
a CT provider running in this way does not have to be trusted by any clients making requests for
certicate proofs.
We assume that CT security properties are still valid, namely, that unauthorized and/or malicious
modications to certicates will be detected with extremely high probability by a sucient number
of auditing nodes. Thus, we focus specically on the privacy implications of CT queries.
3.1.2 Security Definition
We dene security as preserving the user’s privacy. When a user queries the CT server, they
should be able to receive the correct proof for the desired domain without revealing to the server
what they asked for.
Even if given two potential domains a and b, and observing many client requests for one of
the domains, a malicious CT log provider should not be able to infer the identity of the queried
site any better than a random guesser. Similarly, patterns of requests for the same domain should
not reveal any information to the server (e.g. a new movie trailer drives a sudden trac spike to
streaming website a.com so any new repeated requests to a given domain is more likely to be a
request for that website).
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Our security denition only concerns itself with user privacy, and not that of the server. Since
certicate information is meant to be public anyway, it is not a major security threat for a client to
know the public keys of domains that they did not ask for. However, we still wish to avoid this
scenario to minimize overhead and unnecessary transfers.
3.2 Design Proposal
3.2.1 Goals
We focus on two primary design goals:
• Client queries for a domain’s certicate do not leak the requested domain to the CT server,
as discussed above, without relying on a trusted third party or hardware enclave.
• Preserving client privacy imposes reasonable overheads on CT log administration and user
requests.
3.2.2 Oblivious Merkle Trees
Merkle trees are a special type of binary tree in which a node’s value is equal to a hash of its
children. Thus, if the value of a node changes even a tiny bit, that change will propagate up to the
value of the Merkle tree root [13].
In the context of certicate transparency, Merkle trees provide a mechanism for users to check
the validity of a certicate from a log server with logarithmic eciency [4]. An attacker trying
to falsify a certicate cannot realistically nd hash collisions well enough to give a valid proof.
Merkle trees make it infeasible for an attacker to edit or append certicates without being quickly
caught.
However, traditional CT allows the server storing the Merkle tree can easily determine which
node a client is requesting the validity proof for (and thus which website a client is trying to visit).
This is because the proof consists of the siblings of the nodes on the path from the root to the node
the client wishes to validate.
To make certicate transparency work privately, we need to store Merkle trees obliviously.
While Oblix [14] is successful at this, our goal is to do the same without relying on secure hardware
enclaves. Specically, we wish to access specic nodes of the Merkle tree, just as in the non-
oblivious certicate transparency public key lookup and proof, without revealing which node we
accessed.
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Figure 3.1: The two servers use two-party computation to create the client’s request, without
knowing the other’s share.
We do this by using two non-colluding servers that are capable of 2PC. Similar to the Oblix
Merkle tree implementation, nodes are identied using an oblivious index [14]. Instead of relying
on secure enclave, however, we take advantage of the "separation of powers" provided by two-party
computation.
We store the Merkle tree nodes and certicate data using ORAM [19] on one server, and the
position mappings on the other. One server knows the values of the nodes, and the other server
knows the positions of the nodes, but neither knows both. Only the user gets both the position and
value shares, and can assemble this information privately to generate the Merkle tree proof. This
setup still uses the original tree structure of the data nodes and operates at O(logn) per request.
3.2.3 Scalability
The crux of our solution to providing private queries on public CT data relies on a scalable
private storage mechanism. Many existing private storage solutions (as discussed in Section 7 are
inecient, do not scale to many users, rely on a trusted proxy or specialized hardware, or some
combination of these.
Using ORAM and 2PC alone would fulll the rst requirement. However, while oblivious le
sharing performs signicantly better than existing private le storage systems, its initial version
is does not scale to serve the entire world’s CT requests. The basic system can only process a
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single request at a time in serial due to the ORAM construction, so multiple users making many
simultaneous requests results in fast-growing latencies. Currently, reading a 4KB le from this
basic system takes about 2.5s when there are many les in the system under our testing setup,
which we will discuss further in Section 5.
One key design consideration for CT is that because certicate validation is performed online
and in batches, providing latencies that are good enough for real-time browsing is unnecessary
in this context. However, to realistically serve many clients, our system must be able to more
gracefully handle multiple requests in parallel.
A primary focus of our project is to modify this existing system to make it more eciently serve
multiple concurrent requests. We do so by precomputing encryption exponentiations and garbled
circuits, pipelining relevant stages, and batching similar requests.
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4 Implementation
4.1 Implementing Oblivious Merkle Trees
We make the same assumptions as was mentioned in the threat model in Section 3: the client has
access to two mutually distrustful servers. These servers can both independently be passively
malicious, but they do not collude. In implementing the oblivious Merkle tree, we use C and its
associated libraries like Obliv-C [22] for the baseline system implementation.
One server is responsible for storing the actual data, that is, the certicate transparency Merkle
tree nodes. The other server knows the random position mapping for the nodes (analogous to
the oblivious index of Oblix). By using oblivious transfer, the two servers can secret share the
position mapping and use two-party computation to generate the two shares of the nal value. As
the client is the only one that possesses both shares simultaneously, they are they only one who
receives the nal result. A basic version of this protocol is shown in Algorithm 1.
Once a node has been accessed, it must be evicted and and randomly placed back in the server as
in Circuit ORAM to prevent the server from linking a previous request to a later request. Otherwise,
a server will be able to tell that the user has accessed the same node multiple times. The eviction
protocol is shown in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 1: The basic strategy for requesting the Merkle tree proof in our oblivious CT
scheme, as seen in 2PC [12] and oblivious transfer [3]. For simplicity we exclude the standard
permissions and correctness checks.
Input: server1 (Merkle nodes), server2 (position mappings)
circuit = server1 and server 2 agree on a circuit to compute the Merkle proof
garbledCircuit, labels = server2.garble(circuit)
encryptedPosmap = server2.encrypt(positionMap, labels)
encryptedMerkle = server1.obliviousRequest(ctMerkle, labels)
server2.send(server1, garbledCircuit)
server2.send(server1, encryptedPosmap)
encryptedProof = server1.eval(garbledCircuit, encryptedMerkle, encryptedPosmap)
outputLabel = server1.decrypt(garbledCircuit, encryptedProof)
share1 = server1.format2PC(outputLabel)
server1.send(client, share1)
share2 = server2.format2PC(garbledCircuit)
server2.send(client, share2)
merkleProof = client.recompute(share1, share2)
Result: Obliviously fetches and returns the required blocks for a Merkle tree proof.
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Algorithm 2: evict(): The basic eviction strategy when obliviously requesting the Merkle
tree proof in our private CT scheme, as seen in 2PC [12] and Circuit ORAM [19].
Input: CerticateNode
merkTree = Server1.initMerkleTree();
posMap = Server2.initPositionMapping();
List proofNodes = [required nodes for Merkle proof of CerticateNode]
for node in proofNodes do
nodePosition = posMap.getPosition(node)
path = path to nodePosition
deepest = Prepare deepest legal node for eviction
target = Prepare target block for writing
holdBlock = ⊥
destination = ⊥
for i in [0 ... length of path] do
writeBlock = ⊥
if holdBlock != ⊥ and i == destination then
writeBlock = holdBlock
holdBlock = ⊥
destination = ⊥
end
if target != ⊥ then
holdBlock = read and remove deepest legal block in path[i]
destination = target[i]
end
if writeBlock != ⊥ then
path[i].write(writeBlock)
end
end
end
Result: After fetching the required blocks for the Merkle tree proof, reshues the blocks in
ORAM.
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4.2 Implementing Scaling
In this section, we describe our changes to the baseline oblivious le sharing system implementation
that allow it to scale more eciently when servicing multiple requests concurrently.
4.2.1 Precomputation
Oblivious transfer protocols use asymmetric encryption and garbled circuits. Both of these
processes are computationally expensive and used many times in the sharing protocol, but are
also independent of the inputs and CT itself. Thus, they can be precomputed oine, separate
from the actual requests. This should improve both individual request latency as well as the total
throughput of the system.
Modern asymmetric encryption schemes involve computing exponents of very large numbers.
This can be done in a separate thread from the one that services requests. Afterwards, the values
can be retrieved as needed. We only need to be careful to protect the precomputed exponentiations
from cache timing attacks.
Garbled circuits [21] are also very time-consuming because they cannot be reused, and a new one
must be computed for each transfer. Having one server generate a garbled circuit and then transfer
it to the other only when needed introduces signicant latency and could be ooaded to another
set of servers that computes them oine or in the background. Again, this can be computed
simultaneously with and separately from the rest of the transfer protocol. While the garbled circuit
itself is important for the transfer, the composition of the circuit itself is independent of the request
so long as it takes the proper number of inputs, is properly randomized, and changed for every
request. We generate the garbled circuits in a separate thread on demand.
4.2.2 Pipelining
The system’s server-side protocol to access les can be seen as a series of sequential stages. Some
of these stages must be performed sequentially for a single request, while others can happen in
parallel.
The nine main stages of a single request are listed below:
1. Receiving client requests and validating commitments.
2. Performing permissions checks on the user and les.
3. Obliviously fetching the CT Merkle tree node positions.
4. Obliviously fetching the CT Merkle tree proof nodes.
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5. Generating a permutation to shue the paths in ORAM.
6. Applying the generated permutation to ORAM.
7. Computing the 2PC result shares for each server.
8. Secret sharing the result to the client.
9. Recomputing the result based on the given secret shares.
The system cannot concurrently fetch a new path from ORAM while the previous permutation
has not been applied to ORAM. This results either in a loss of obliviousness if the permutation is
not performed at all, or an incorrect lookup if the two operations happen concurrently.
On the other hand, stages 1-2 are completely independent of the following stages, as long as we
are careful not to nish the revealing process before the validations and permissions checks are
nished. This suggests that the system could benet from pipelining these stages, or overlapping
the execution stages across requests to provide partial parallelism and improve performance when
servicing multiple requests.
Our design is limited by the fact that Obliv-C [22] currently only supports a single thread running
two-party computations. This means, for example, that while stages 2 and 3 could be pipelined,
we are not able to do so as we must perform all 2PC in a single thread. Adding parallelism would
require major modications to Obliv-C that are outside the scope of this project.
Our implementation consists of three logical groups of stages that run in separate threads:
stage 1, stages 2-6, and stages 7-9. While performing all 2PC in a single stage is not ideal, in fact
the group consisting of stages 2-6 is the bottleneck, so splitting stages 2-6 would not result in a
signicant speedup.
4.2.3 Batching
In scenarios such as Certicate Transparency, client latency is a small concern compared to the
impact of raw throughput on scalability. We explore how to widen bottlenecks in the pipeline
discussed above by batching and processing multiple independent requests in parallel. While this
approach results in longer per-request processing times, we can increase the ability of server pairs
to handle higher load.
We rst enable the system to successfully process interleaved requests – two or more simul-
taneously transmitted query shares may arrive at a server in any order and still be processed
correctly. We synchronize and update the pending, incomplete queries by their commitment values
and expose a queue-based interface to the main le access handler, similar to the queues used to
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implement pipelining. The handler withdraws requests from the queue, synchronizes with the
second server, and processes the query as normal. This capability allows for processing sets of
batched requests, simply by withdrawing more than 1 query at a time from the incoming queue.
Interacting with the ORAM requires a set of individual path queries, so it is dicult to fully
merge a batch of queries. However, we observe that the Circuit ORAM’s tree-based structure
results in notable overlap between dierent operations. In addition, while computing over the
small le-index ORAM is quite quick in a 2-party computation setting, operations on the larger
lesystem tree is more costly. Rather than synchronizing the data ORAM serially for every request,
we compose the changes caused by the batch as a whole to require at most one update per block
in the tree.
As a simple example, imagine a query that results in a block eviction into the root, followed by a
second query whose result moves the same block from the tree root to a bucket at a leaf. Operating
sequentially, we would follow these exact steps and relocate the same data block twice. On the
other hand, applying multiple operations to the index ORAM tree at once, while performing the
appropriate ushes, can yield more ecient updates, in this case directly from the stash into a leaf
bucket.
Implementing this requires a fundamental change to the type of permutation generated by the
2PC before it is applied by each server to the data ORAM. Whereas previous permutations consist
solely of two paths intersecting only at the stash and root, composing the result of many individual
evictions requires combining a subtree of varying shape, depending on the particular slice of the
eviction schedule. Maintaining a full-tree permutation representation is not memory ecient or
necessary; instead, we continue to track changes to the ORAM tree in a global context (rather
than relative to the current eviction path), but in a lightweight C macro-based map [18] that scales
the batch size.
We found that removing path-relative tracking reduces the complexity of index management
required to track ORAM changes, as we can reset the index values at any point and derive any
changes made to the entire tree after some amount of processing. This structure can be collapsed
into an array with explicit index labels in order to create permutation shares for the individual
machines and apply the tracked changes to the lesystem itself.
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5 Evaluation
Our primary evaluation mechanism was observing the behavior of the modied oblivious le
sharing system under load from multiple concurrent clients, requesting as many randomly-selected
les as possible over a 60 second window, extracting latency and throughput behavior as the
number of competing clients (e.g. potential CT-enabled browsers) increases.
For our testing we used an Ubuntu m5d.xlarge NVMe SSD type AWS instance running on one
core with 150GB memory. Without any improvements at all, a single serial request may take 2.5s
or more on our experimental setup depending on the request size and database size.
While we did observe positive trends associated with our systems-level optimizations, they
did not signicantly change the overall complexity of processing each request. Due to general
resource constraints and the aforementioned request complexity, we had to limit our evaluation to
small numbers of parallel clients instead of the larger scale that would be more realistically seen
in a potential real-world datacenter.
5.1 Precomputation
As discussed previously, encryption caching by itself provides a little bit of speedup but does not
change the overall complexity. Similarly, precomputing the garbled circuits technically does not
change the big-O complexity, but in practice shaves o more time than caching of exponentiation
results. Together, they make the latency more bearable.
5.2 Pipelining
Figure 5.1 evaluates the impact of encryption and garbled circuit precomputation/caching and
the pipelining mentioned in Section 4 on client latency. The lled in measurements represent
clients running a two-stage pipeline, and indicate that such a technique can slightly increase the
eectiveness of other optimization. Specically, as the number of concurrent clients increases,
simply pre-computing exponentiations does not benet client latency, but pipelining lowers
average latency by a constant factor and benets exponentiation. This is likely due to the fact
22
Figure 5.1: Average client latency under contention, with pipelining enabled and disabled.
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that the caching in the baseline serial implementation only occurs when there are no requests
to be handled, whereas the inclusion of multiple pipeline stage threads allows exponentiation to
persist in the background. Thus, we believe the ability to concurrently schedule dierent tasks
can directly impact overall system eectiveness.
Figure 5.2 tracks server-side throughput with multiple outstanding requests (in these experi-
ments, the clients only send one query at a time). As expected, pipelining performs at the same
level as the baseline when only one request is processed at a time since each of the other stages
are empty. Throughput rises drastically with two parallel requests (lling up both current pipeline
stages) and attens out with increased load as the pipeline is completely full. As mentioned earlier,
a more exible MPC implementation with multithreading capabilities would enable much ner
granularity (more pipeline stages) and therefore more signicant performance gains. The best-
performing combination in terms of throughput was again both precomputation and pipelining
with an approximate 22% performance gain, although a pure pipelining-based approach was even-
tually able to exceed the initial raw performance boost oered by pre-computation. Again, as with
latency, which these improvements do make the system faster, they do not perform signicantly
better as more and more requests are provided.
5.3 Batching
We successfully modied the oblivious Circuit ORAM implementation used by our le sharing
system to track and collapse subtree-based modications for arbitrary batch sizes as described in
Section 4. However, we encountered an late implementation issue using Obliv-C to expose the
per-server permutations to each party in the 2PC. Thus, while we can demonstrate that such a
method will work in practice, we were not able to perform the same evaluation as above while
batching was enabled.
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Figure 5.2: Server throughput as the number of parallel requests grows, with pipelining enabled
and disabled.
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6 Conclusion and Open estions
We have shown that while conducting private queries on public databases is possible without the
use of hardware enclaves, the opportunity for systems-based approaches to make scalability gains
is signicant. Neither our upgraded oblivious le sharing system nor similar privacy-preserving
systems are ready to serve hundreds of millions of users, but they provide an important rst step.
This demonstrates that improvement of performance while preserving privacy is possible, and
more work will make our goal a reality.
Currently, it is possible that specic individuals with the right personal incentives, such as
human rights workers or asylum seekers, would be willing to deal with the extra latency for the
sake of privacy and security.
To serve users at scale, our system needs to be able to scale to multiple machines. There has
been work on distributed ORAM in the past such as such as ObliviStore [16] and TaoStore [15],
but designing a similar construction that works with 2PC and in the larger oblivious le sharing
system presents a signicant challenge.
One possible area for even future improvement is making the requests for the Merkle tree proof
more ecient. Currently, we individually request each node in the Merkle tree proof. However,
being able to do the requests and evictions in one pass would reduce the overall request time. We
must be careful, however, to ensure that none of the requests reveal anything about the others, and
thus hide from the server the path of the Merkle tree proof and the ultimate value of the originally
requested certicate at the leaf.
As a side note, it would be helpful to see how our implementation holds up against a real-world
CT server. The publicly available source code on Github by Google has two versions, a deprecated
C version and a newer Golang version. Because the existing oblivious le sharing system and most
of our codebase has already been implemented in C, we have been working with the deprecated C
version of CT as well for simplicity’s sake.
While the protocols often used in such projects are highly studied and constructed for eciency,
real-world cryptosystems are only broadly adopted if they are practical to deploy and operate
at reasonable cost. We hope to continue our work on both privacy-sensitive, secure internet
infrastructure, including Certicate Transparency, and scalable private systems in general.
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